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Abstract
Background: The need of improving the governance of healthcare services has brought health professionals into
management positions. However, both the processes and outcomes of this policy change highlight differences
among the European countries. This article provides in-depth evidence that neither quantitative data nor cross-
country comparisons have been able to provide regarding the influence of hybrids in the functioning of hospital
organizations and impact on clinicians’ autonomy and exposure to hybridization.
Methods: The study was designed to witness the process of institutional change from the inside and while that
process was underway. It reports a case study carried out in a public hospital in Portugal when the establishment
of a clinical directorate was being negotiated. Data collection comprises semi-structured interviews with general
managers and surgeons complemented with observations.
Results: The clinical directorate under study illustrates a divisionalized professional bureaucracy model that combines
features of professional bureaucracies and divisionalized forms. The hybrid manager is key to understand the extent to
which practising clinicians are more accountable and to whom given that managerial tools of control have not been
strengthened, and trust-based relations allow them to keep professional autonomy untouched. In sum, clinicians are
allowed to profit from their activity and to perform autonomously from the hospital’s board of directors. The
advantageous conditions enjoyed by the clinical directorate intensify internal re-stratification in medicine, thus
suggesting forms of divisionalized medical professionalism grounded in organizational dynamics.
Conclusion: It is discussed the extent to which policy change to the governance of health organizations
regarding the relationship between medicine and management is subject to specific constraints at the workplace
level, thus conditioning the expected outcomes of policy setting. The study also highlights the role of hybrid managers
in determining the extent to which practising professionals are more accountable to managerial criteria. The overall
conclusion is that although medical and managerial values link to each other, clinicians reconfigure managerial criteria
according to specific interests. Ultimately, medical autonomy and authority may be reinforced in organizational settings
subject to NPM-driven reforms.
Keywords: Hybrid management, Clinical directorate, Divisionalized professional bureaucracy, Organized
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Background
The need of improving the governance of healthcare ser-
vices has brought health professionals into management
positions, thereby performing hybrid management roles
[1, 2]. Professional and managerial knowledge is grow-
ingly perceived as complementary [3], and more evi-
dence has showed that hybrid managers enhance clinical
and management outcomes [4, 5]. Frequently the medical
profession has supported this policy change by encour-
aging skill acquisition in medical leadership, therefore
making doctors keen on quality, innovation and perform-
ance [6, 7]. In sum, hybrids are blurring traditional profes-
sional identities and models of work organization.
However, both the processes and outcomes of this policy
change highlight differences across countries [8, 9]. One
variation concerns the types of hybrids experienced in dif-
ferent organizational structures [10, 11]. Another variation
concerns the extent to which clinicians have become ac-
countable to external players, including patients, allied
health professionals, and management itself [12–15].
Despite the significant growth of the literature on hy-
brid management, detailed attention is still necessary as
regards micro-level processes of role configuration and
relations among hybrids and their medical peers. This
article goes in this direction, in particular by focusing on
the process of organizational change involving hybrid
management roles. Drawing on the case of clinical direc-
torates (CDs) in Portugal, the analysis intends to provide
evidence on how hybrid roles impact on practising clini-
cians’ autonomy and exposure to hybridization. Further-
more, few attempts have been made to incorporate CDs
into the literature on organizational configuration. The
relevance of the Portuguese case lies in the distinctive
traits of health reforms compared to other known
Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries.
The article is structured as follows. First, we focus on
the broad discussion of hybrid management roles in the
health sector. Second, CDs are described as the finest
examples across countries of the interplay between man-
agement and medicine. This allows us to address the aim
of the study and its underlying assumptions, as well as to
consider the evidence on CDs in the overall context of
NPM-driven reforms in Portugal. The methods section is
followed by the empirical analysis of the functioning and
structure of the CDs selected for the study and the role of
the hybrid manager on practising clinicians’ autonomy
and exposure to hybridization. The evidence is then dis-
cussed in the light of the research questions. The conclud-
ing discussion includes reflection on the implications for
practise and directions for future research.
Patterns of hybridization in hospital organizations
Hospitals are co-habited by two structures of authority
once assumed difficult to reconcile [16]. One is the
rational-legal structure linked to administrative processes
and rationale while the other is the charismatic structure
linked to professional processes and rationale. These
structures make hospitals one of the finest examples of a
professional bureaucracy. Since professionals have great
expertise and high status, they have autonomy to make
their own decisions, thus affecting the outcomes of the
organization. Professionalism is the prime coordinating
mechanism of the organizational structure. Coordination
mechanisms are based on the standardization of skills due
to little administrative control over work and low activity
planning. The role of professionalism also means formal
delegation of skills to the lower levels of the organization,
as well as informal delegation of skills within the same
hierarchical level (e.g. patients’ referral) [17, 18].
However, professional authority goes beyond its cha-
rismatic scope given that health professionals, mostly
doctors, have historically been in management positions
[19]. One of the effects of the reform started in the 80s,
also known as New Public Management (NPM), was to
change this overly profession-based governance struc-
ture of hospitals as a result of mistrust in self-regulated
knowledge and of the need to enhance the efficient use
of resources [20, 21]. NPM-driven reforms have labelled
a wide range of policy change worldwide in order to
strengthen administrative authority in public services
[22–24]. Particularly in the hospital sector this has been ac-
complished by limiting professionals’ room for manoeuvre
through managerial tools and guidelines or their authority
through the split between clinical and management duties
[25]. Unsurprisingly, the number of general managers
rose considerably across all management levels of
hospital organizations during this time [26].
Yet, health professionals continued to resist NPM-
driven reforms [27], and no clear benefits of the split
between clinical and management duties were found as
to the quality of care and effectiveness of decision-
making [28]. Despite differences across countries in tim-
ing, pace and goals, these outcomes have been generally
described as a turning point in policy agenda in which
mostly medicine but also nursing were again co-opted
into management positions [29]. The literature refers to
this as hybrid leadership or hybrid management. The
term “hybrid” is used to refer to managers with a profes-
sional background that are able to embody, translate,
and mediate the logics of both management and profes-
sions [30, 31]. At least two main differences distinguish
the current standpoint of hybrid roles from the past.
One is the fact that hybrids are expected to have skills in
management, and the chain of command is expected to
result in actual changes in work models and profes-
sionals’ accountability. The other difference is the blur of
professional and managerial values. Freidson [19] origin-
ally defined professionalism as a normative conception
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of specialized knowledge that should be self-organized
and controlled apart from management and markets in
order to provide society with especially important ser-
vices like those linked to health care.
Resulting from hybridization, the concept of profes-
sionalism has evolved to better articulate professional
and organizational logics as illustrated in organized
professionalism [32]. Although it is no longer possible to
reflect on professions and organizations as detached
from one another, it remains controversial, particularly
for clinicians in hospital organizations, their link to
organizational dynamics and processes.
Changing contexts for hybridization: the example of
clinical directorates
Although different types of hybrids have been experi-
enced in different organizational structures, CDs have
been found to be in several countries the finest exam-
ples of doctors taking managerial positions in hospital
organizations [26].
CDs are middle-line organizational structures that
consist of autonomous multidisciplinary frameworks of
care delivery, where clinicians assume management roles
[33]. The existing evidence on CDs generally highlights
that, on the one hand, hybrid managers experience eth-
ical dilemmas in combining clinical and management
decisions [34] and, on the other, clinicians are reluctant
to embrace management duties due to the loss of auton-
omy in decision-making [26] or lack of teamwork effect-
iveness [35]. However, little attention has been devoted
to the role of hybrid managers as key in determining
organizational change itself, namely the functioning of
CDs. The literature often opts for institutional readings
focused on broad influences linked to politics, economy,
science, or technology [36], while professionals are rele-
gated to a marginal position as to how they relate to and
make use of such influences at the workplace level.
Perhaps more important is to find that CDs have been
roughly defined as “a move from professional bureaucracy
to a divisionalized form” [33: 10]. This definition is far
from being clear in the light of the non-articulation be-
tween divisionalized structures and professional bureau-
cracies as described in the literature on organizational
configuration [17]. In sum, little is known about the ef-
fects of CDs on the configuration of hospital organizations
as a professional bureaucracy model.
The aim of the study and underlying assumptions
This article proposes to go deeper into the daily reality
of CDs while illustrating an organizational structure
where management and medicine are deeply embedded
in each other. It seeks to witness the process of institu-
tional change underpinning the creation of such an
organizational configuration by highlighting the impact
of hybrid managers on the organization’s functioning
and on practising clinicians in terms of their autonomy
in decision-making and exposure to hybridization. The
aim is to fill the gap in the current knowledge on
hybridization and the functioning of CDs as organizational
structures where medicine and management stand par-
ticularly close together. As to hybridization, it has been
simply assumed that clinicians align their professionalism
with managerialism (the normative value system of man-
agement); and that managerialism is the primary driver of
change in view of organizations’ growing commitment to
cost-containment, administrative predictability, and
awareness of users’ needs and rights [37]. As to the func-
tioning of CDs, it is still unclear the connection between
professionalism and divisionalized forms given that the
literature considers these organizational dynamics to be
incompatible.
Our contribution to the debate is structured around
the following research questions. First, it is intended to
examine how the interplay between professional and
managerial logics embodied in hybrid managers shape
the functioning of CDs concerning their structure and
processes. As mentioned, although CDs have been long
established in several countries, few attempts have been
made to incorporate them into the literature on
organizational configurations. Secondly, it is intended to
show the effects of hybrid managers on practising clini-
cians’ autonomy and relationship with management. In
other words, it seeks to find whether hybrids contribute
to the hybridization of clinicians with no managerial
duties or whether they act as gatekeepers of traditional
forms of professionalism, thus keeping management
outside of professional boundaries.
These research questions build on the following theor-
etical arguments. One argument is that organizations are
considered as sites of contingent dynamics in which
macro-level policies are subject to open-end processes of
negotiation and conflict among and within professions.
Not surprisingly, alliances and disputes between profes-
sionals and managers [38] are expected to take place at
the workplace level, and the managerial roles taken by
professionals are re-stratifying professions in complex
ways [39, 40].
Another argument is that clinical and managerial
values are not necessarily in opposition to each other,
given that professions and organizations are similarly ex-
posed to the pressure for increased performance [37].
Recent evidence has, however, challenged the assump-
tion of linear causality between the instruments of
governance and the effects on the relationship between
medicine and management [41]. Additionally, few at-
tempts have been made to include national-based pol-
icies under which clinicians get involved in management
[26]. NPM-driven reforms more generally and CDs more
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specifically have been reported across the world around
basic principles of private sector-style management,
measurement, top-down targets, ‘quasi-markets’, and
quality improvement initiatives. Yet, national variations
should not be underestimated. In some countries, clini-
cians have been able to protect self-regulated spaces in-
side organizations despite the growing exposure to
mechanisms of organizational control and accountability
to other players, including allied health professionals,
general managers, and patients [42]. Possible explana-
tions include the fact that clinicians are able to filter and
make use of broad managerial interventions [3, 43] or
that medical professionalism comprises different values
[44]. Therefore, instead of simply assuming a conver-
gence between professional and managerial logics, it
should be tested how clinicians relate to the normative
value system of management. Ultimately the goal is to
contribute to the opening of the black box of the inter-
play between medicine and management in hospitals
containing a CD structure.
The reform pathway of hospital management in Portugal
The Portuguese healthcare system is structured around
a tax-funded NHS since 1979 that combines public
financing and provision of care. Historically, the govern-
ance structure of hospitals has been overly centralized in
clinicians, whether or not they have formal skills in
management [45]. Growing concern with the quality of
care and transparency in decision-making has led to sev-
eral policy changes in the general assumptions of NPM.
The first reforms date from the late 90s and then
became systematic. They were aimed at ensuring hospi-
tals greater autonomy from national and regional levels
and a split between clinical and management roles [46].
After 2002 most Portuguese public hospitals have under-
gone similar institutional changes, which are summa-
rized in Table 1. In one word: the broad political
standpoint is similar to that in the UK during the Grif-
fiths’ report in the early 80s, which translates into re-
forms aimed to increase the opening of management
positions throughout the hierarchy line of hospitals and
the admission of general managers to those positions.
CDs have emerged in this context but reflect the overall
misunderstanding in terms of policy agenda regarding the
desired position for clinicians, allied health professionals,
general managers, and patients in the governance struc-
ture of hospitals. On the one hand, accountability and
transparency have been pursued with a view at diluting
medical authority. On the other hand, decision-making
has not become more inclusive of allied health profes-
sionals and patients [47], and there are no specific criteria
for those who are expected to play as hospital managers,
including the obligation to hold degrees in management.
As a result, no data is available to infer the profile of
hospital managers.
CDs have been reported to exist in hospitals since the
90s [48]. Their establishment is regulated by the Minis-
try of Health under the expression of interest by the
hospital’s board of directors in articulation with the
senior consultant who is later appointed as the CD’s
clinical director. The clinical director enjoys full auton-
omy and control over both clinical and management
Table 1 Summary of policy change in Portuguese hospitals
Policy change Examples
Decentralization of competencies • Purchaser/provider split: public organizations turned into public corporations and afterwards into
public enterprises
• Flexible models of human resources management (individual labour contracts; appraisal system;
culture of meritocracy)
• Accounts controlled by a single supervisor (board of directors) appointed by the Ministry of Health
• Directors of departments appointed among the most qualified doctors by the hospital’s board
of directors
Financing control • Performance-based funding (DRGs)
• Non-compliance with contracted activity penalizes the following year’s budget
• Budget control tools at the organizational and ward levels
• Evaluation in accordance with quantitative criteria
Managerial control • Evidence-based procedures (cost/benefit ratio)
• Clinical guidelines (for monitoring and assessing incentives and sanctions)
• Administrative approval of medical decisions
• Opening of management positions in departments (middle-level structures of control)
• Hiring of general managers
Deregulation of the labour market • Rise in individual contracts, short-term contracts, and service provision
• Freezing of professional careers
• Increase in wage variation within health professions
Quality and safety controls • Monitoring technological tools
• Quality reports
• Internal and external audits and benchmarking
• Procedures to monitor malpractice
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duties and may be assisted by an administrator on mat-
ters related to accounting, interface with the hospital’s
board of directors, and so on. The Portuguese legislation
refers to CDs as the most innovative business-like ex-
perience in public hospitals that helps achieve greater
efficiency of resources while giving users improved ac-
cess to cutting-edge healthcare services and ensuring
professionals’ commitment and accountability to the
organization [48]. A specific funding scheme different
from the hospital includes overpayment of procedures and
increased salaries based on target-meeting and contracting,
thus making CDs the most attractive organizational model
to clinicians.
The evidence is not clear regarding the extent to
which the business-based governance model of CDs has
shaped clinical values and autonomy. At the macro level,
the engagement of medical associations and unions with
management is ambivalent and no significant changes
have been made in medical education. At the micro
level, policy implementation has been fragmented and
the experiences are hazy.
CDs in the Portuguese healthcare system are worth
exploring against other known cases in Europe with re-
spect to hybrid roles and hybridization [26]. On the one
hand, the pathway of reforms in the governance of
hospitals in Portugal did not emerge from a broad consen-
sus nor did it involve effective roles by allied health profes-
sionals as in countries like Denmark. On the other hand,
differently from countries like England where few manage-
ment positions were filled by doctors and the admission of
general managers increased clinical and financial account-
ability, in Portugal clinicians have consistently been inter-
ested in filling management positions. Evidence further
suggests that they have been given autonomy in terms of
both clinical and financial tools of control [45].
Methods
The study was designed to witness the process of institu-
tional change from the inside and while that process was
underway. Accordingly, evidence is not intended for
comparison or extrapolation. Rather, it seeks to provide
in-depth knowledge on day-to-day interactions that nei-
ther cross-country comparisons nor quantitative data are
able to provide. A multi-step criterion for the selection of
the hospital(s) was followed. First, it should be publicly
funded so that the interplay between State/managerial
regulation and professional medical self-regulation is more
intense. Second, it had to be going through institutional
change at the time of data collection so that it could be
possible to test the interplay between the two regula-
tion logics. Third, it had to comprise a CD structure in
which a hybrid manager is responsible for both clinical
and managerial decisions.
Data collection and analysis
The research was carried out in the only public hospital
undergoing change at the time of data collection into a
public enterprise, and it was limited to the surgery depart-
ment where the establishment of a CD was being negoti-
ated. Data collection comprised semi-structured interviews
complemented with observations. By combining these
techniques the purpose was to relate discourses and behav-
iours previous to and during the establishment of the CD,
in addition to ensuring the accuracy of the information
collected during the interviews. Interviews comprised a list
of bullet points addressing the same analytical dimensions
as for the observations (Table 2).
Direct observations were made on a regular basis, at
least 20 h per week (nearly one year). Professionals
were informed about the aim and scope of the re-
search and their anonymity was guaranteed. The
Table 2 Summary of the process of data collection
Analytical dimensions Place of observation Interviewees
Interplay between the hospital’s board of directors
and the CD’s clinical director
Formal and informal meetings (hospital’s
board of directors and CD)
General managers
Clinical director
General managers’ interference in surgeons’ work In-room consultations
Operating rooms
Informal talks in random places
General managers
Practising surgeons
Clinical director’s interference in surgeons’ work In-room consultations
Operating rooms
Informal talks in random places
Clinical director
Practising surgeons
Surgeons’ view of their practise and autonomy In-room consultations
Operating rooms
Informal talks in random places
Practising surgeons
Change in the delivery of care (teamwork,
communication flows, selection of cases,
decision-making on clinical cases)
Clinical cases meetings
In-room consultations
Operating rooms
General managers
Clinical director
Practising surgeons
Which managerial and clinical tools are used
and who controls them
Formal and informal meetings (hospital’s
board of directors and CD)
Clinical cases meetings
General managers
Clinical director
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research team had access to daily activities, including
those taking place in restricted areas. Field observa-
tions were recorded manually in a field diary while
conducting the observations. The field diary required
two writing phases: in the first, the text was written
up in full so that unexpected connections between
events that might contradict the existing literature
could be captured. In the second phase, the writing of
observations followed the analytical dimensions rele-
vant to the study.
As to the interviews, 18 in-depth, semi-structured in-
terviews were made with all general managers on the
hospital’s board of directors (n = 3) and surgeons (one to
the clinical director plus 14 to practising surgeons in-
cluding residents, clinical assistants, associate specialists,
and senior consultants).
Allied health professionals were excluded from the
study, because during the observations it became clear
that surgeons were the only professionals negotiating
the establishment of the CD with both the hospital’s
board of directors and the Ministry of Health. More-
over, the study focuses specifically on its effects on
medical professionalism.
The interviews took place at the respondents’ work-
place and lasted between 60 and 120 min. Inter-
viewees authorized the use of a recording device and
were informed that the contents would be transcribed
in full.
The field diary and interviews were later transcribed
in full and processed with the MAXQDA software
for qualitative content analysis, which was used to
compile information both by dimension and by
respondent.
Results
Organizational features of the CD: its funding and
functioning
A CD is a medical department with a clinical director to
which management duties are formally delegated by the
hospital’s board of directors:
It represents the financial and administrative
autonomy that would be ideal for me. It would
allow me to hire according to my specific targets, I
could invoice our work and then pay our salaries.
Part of the profits we would bring to the hospital
would ultimately be distributed for investment and
staff. […] This money would enable me to hire my
own specialists and also staff to complement my
multidisciplinary group. […] (Clinical director)
Although its establishment is formally conducted by the
hospital’s board of directors together with the Minister of
Health, the senior consultant, who is appointed as the
CD’s clinical director, plays a key role in this process:
[on the establishment process of the CD]
Everything depends on me. I’ve set the conditions
and timing with the former minister [of health]
and the current [minister] will definitely comply
with the arrangement […] the hospital’s board of
directors has no word in this. I’m in control of
everything. (Clinical director)
Practising surgeons support this organizational change
in the expectation of profiting from their practise in view
of the overpayment procedures CDs are subject to. The
procedures performed here are among the most costly
to the NHS:
What keeps me working here? I can actually make
money from my activity as a public servant (surgeon #3)
Medical staff and allied health professionals are in
exclusive dedication to the CD. The same happens to
administrative staff including general managers whose
role is to support clinical decision on issues such as
hiring staff, defining performance targets, and decid-
ing the investment policy in medical technologies. As
a result, the CD requires the creation of an autonomous
organizational structure inside the hospital comprising a
strategic apex, a specific middle line, support staff, and an
operational core with which the hospital contracts the ac-
tivity (performance, costs, quality indicators, and so on).
The more the time I spend here the more I realize I
am in an organization inside another organization.
The administrative procedures here are not common
to other departments, nor are the targets, mechanisms
of accountability or human resources management.
(note of the field diary)
The clinical director is expected to perform a business-
like management that combines clinical and financial
control and the daily activity of staff is expected to be
optimized according to the productivity targets set by the
clinical director. The underlying assumption is that the
more activity is performed and the higher the quality of
the procedures, the more the CD profits and reinforces its
scientific prestige.
During the observation stage it became evident, how-
ever, that the clinical director has not strengthened tools
of control, namely those related to management (note of
the field diary). Obviously, the clinical director seeks to
ensure predictability in surgeons’ performance regarding
quality and patients’ safety. The issue is that practising
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surgeons reveal a strong commitment to those targets
even in the absence of formal mechanisms of imposed
control. This translates into an informal work model
based on the clinical director’s selection of the staff. Some
of the surgeons working here are former trainees of the
clinical director while the others have been hired directly
by him. In sum, the absence of formal mechanisms of con-
trol is replaced with close ties of commitment, trust, and
shared goals of quality and profit between the clinical dir-
ector and all staff working in the CD.
General managers on the hospital’s board of directors are
supportive of the creation of the CD even at the expense of
losing administrative control. Such interest relies on the
CD’s financial and production targets that are also key to
the hospital as a whole. This argument is better understood
against the NHS internal market: public providers have to
compete to attract funding and patients, and cuts in public
funding and benchmarks are based on quantitative criteria.
Subsequently, informal alliances and disputes between gen-
eral managers and clinics become visible:
The more they [surgeons] perform the more money
they bring to the hospital. We simply need them […]
(General Manager #3)
[…] we have areas of great technical expertise while
others are less so: surgery is strong and powerful, and
it enjoys national and international prestige […]. We
gave them more beds and improved comfort […] in
detriment to other departments. […] So the decisions
weren’t taken so as to give the same to all. No!!!
(General Manager #1)
On the other hand, the CD involves greater differenti-
ation and conflicts within the medical profession, in
addition to highlighting the role of the clinical director
in determining the organizational arrangements of the
hospital as a whole:
Doctors of other departments frequently oppose the
CD… they contest different specific rules and funding
opportunities but mainly the fact that not all medical
specialties can perform as quickly and as predictably
so that they could also apply for CDs in their
departments. (note of the field diary)
The hospital has departments that make no sense. I need
others that can help the CD and not the ones that take
the hospital 100 years back. […] The board of directors
needs to understand […] there are departments that have
not adapted their methods to our needs [of the CD]. […].
The key is to know how I can convince the [hospital’s]
board to make the right changes in the hospital […] it’s
something I’ve been working on… (clinical director)
Broadly speaking, the governance structure and function-
ing of the CD rely on features of medical work. Only those
medical areas involving high technological differentiation
and relatively routinized procedures that allow high patient
turnover meet the principles of standardization required to
the performance-based funding scheme of CDs. By this
mean internal re-stratification in medicine is intensified.
The influence of the hybrid manager on practising
surgeons’ performance
As mentioned above, the clinical director’s control over
staff is informally exerted. This evidence is now reinforced
through practising surgeons’ response to perceived
changes in their work, if they felt more accountable and to
whom. Surgeons were unable to mention changes to their
work, in addition to spending more time in the hospital.
Furthermore, they all said that they feel more accountable
to the clinical director but mostly concerning patient
safety. By no means this implies that surgeons feel
more controlled by the clinical director in their
decision-making. For instance, a large number of clin-
ical meetings or informal talks take place in the absence
of the clinical director to discuss procedures and set
joint decisions concerning cases of high complexity
(note of the field diary). The clinical director focuses
more on meeting overall goals than controlling the pro-
cesses in detail, and he trusts the decisions made by the
team of surgeons. It is worth to emphasize that practis-
ing surgeons were either trained or hired by the clinical
director. In relation to financial control no additional
tools were found or mentioned. The fact that surgeons’
payment is performance-based automatically makes
them accountable to improve individual targets even in
the absence of rules imposing such criteria. When asked
about the possibility of introducing additional financial
tools, surgeons generally do not realize how it can im-
prove the current standards of quantity and quality.
Common to all surgeons is the fact that tools of
control are mentioned only in relation to the clinical dir-
ector, since they are not fully aware of the role or even
presence of the hospital’s board of directors in their daily
life. This results in the fact that surgeons’ projects and
interests lie exclusively in their commitment to the CD
rather than to the hospital as a whole:
The hospital has never given me anything. [The
managers at the board of directors] weren’t
responsible for my training. It’s the clinical director
that I’m indebted to… I owe him a great deal; but no,
I don’t owe the hospital anything! (Surgeon #6)
[…] the hospital is less important [than the CD]. I’ll
go wherever it is established. (Surgeon, #1)
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Both excerpts illustrate effects of divisionalization as
described in the literature but clearly in articulation with
professional values. First, because surgeons show strong
bonds with their peers. Second, because they seem to
widen the gap with the managers at the hospital’s board
of directors. Third, because their commitment is to the
CD rather than to the hospital as a whole, which is par-
ticularly enlightening if one considers the public nature
of this hospital. Surgeons’ performance is thus struc-
tured more according to specific professional criteria
and less to overall goals related to the mission and voca-
tion of the NHS.
Discussion
The clinical directorate within the hospital organization:
arguments of the divisionalized professional bureaucracy
model
Despite the long-term tradition of CDs in different
countries, few attempts have been made to incorporate
these divisionalized structures into the overall debate on
organizational configuration, particularly their link to
the core features of the professional bureaucracy model.
The issue is that this combination is considered to be in-
compatible: “What makes a structure divisionalized is
managerial or unit autonomy, not professional auton-
omy” [17: 215]. Also recent analyses do not elucidate the
extent to which the CD implies articulation, or instead
replacement, between the features of professional bur-
eaucracies and divisionalized forms [33].
Briefly, the non-articulation between both structures is
explained by the pressures underpinning them (profes-
sionalism and balkanization) which are summarized as
follows (see left and right columns of Table 3): decision
flows (bottom-up vis-à-vis top-down); planning and con-
trol systems (little vis-à-vis extensive); support staff
(intended to support professionals vis-à-vis the existing
split between headquarters and divisions with a strong
emphasis on managerialism); autonomy (professional
vis-à-vis managerial). In addition, there is no possible
link particularly in the public sector since the divisiona-
lized form is defined as the evolution of large mechan-
ical bureaucracies towards adjustments in the market of
the lucrative private sector.
The evidence suggests articulation, instead of replace-
ment, between the features of professional bureaucracies
and divisionalized forms. Accordingly, the CD under
study seems to exemplify a divisionalized professional
bureaucracy structure not yet documented in the litera-
ture (as detailed in the centre column of Table 3). First,
it results from the vertical decentralization of duties to
the hybrid manager, notably the management of facilities,
funding and human resources, according to a pay-per-
performance scheme. Second, top-down decision flows
aim to standardize outputs at the same time bottom-up
autonomy is reinforced, since the hybrid manager is given
autonomy to define clinical criteria and compliance with
performance. Third, since it is a hybrid manager who runs
the divisionalized form, the middle line management of
the hospital remains under the control of the operating
core. Fourth, as all staff belongs to the CD, clinical and
managerial duties and guidelines are separated from
hospital’s board of directors. The feature that ultimately
makes the CD a divisionalized professional bureaucracy
structure is the way coordinating mechanisms of
balkanization and professionalism stand together. The cri-
teria underpinning funding and quality is medical-based,
in which management criteria only serve to support
medical governance. However, because not all medical
specialties can apply for and benefit from the conditions
of CDs, re-stratification is expected to enlarge in the
medical profession [49], this way creating effects of
balkanization in medical professionalism (see the refer-
ence to the role of the hybrid manager in negotiating
directly with the Minister of Health the establishment
of the CD).
Linked to the role of the hybrid manager as key in
organizational change, this discussion resonates with re-
cent insights [41, 50, 51], according to which workplace
Table 3 Analytical features of professional bureaucracy/divisionalized form and empirical evidence of the divisionalized professional
bureaucracy
Professional bureaucracy CD as a divisionalized professional
bureaucracy
Divisionalized form
Key coordinating mechanism Standardization of skills Standardization of skills and outputs Standardization of outputs
Key part of organization Operating core Middle line controlled by the operating core Middle line
Support staff Elaborated to support
professionals
Split between headquarters and divisions
to support professionals
Split between headquarters and divisions
Pressure Professionalism Balkanized professionalism Balkanization
Formalization of behaviour Little formalization High formalization High formalization
Planning and control systems Little planning and control High performance control High performance control
Flows of decision making Bottom-up Top-down (with autonomy) Top-down (with autonomy)
Adapted from Mintzberg [17, 18]
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interactions need to be emphasized in the understanding
of the processes and outcomes of organizational change. In
this case, the clinical director not only led to the
establishment of the CD but also moulded the practising
surgeons’ commitment to their work, consequently
affecting their relationship with general managers and
other clinicians.
Effects of hybrid managers on medical professionalism:
features of balkanized-organized professionalism
Building on CDs as an empirical illustration of a divisiona-
lized professional bureaucracy structure, the interaction be-
tween medical professionalism and managerialism requires
a different analytical positioning. The clinical director de-
fines, monitors and assesses both clinical and financial tools
of control through an informal management style based on
trust and share of goals with practising surgeons. Hence it
can be assumed that the clinical director acts as a gate-
keeper of external influences, namely of the hospital’s board
of directors as to how practising surgeons perform daily.
In this sense, the dependency pattern of professional-
ism on organizational spaces and dynamics is confirmed
[32, 37]. However, unlike often assumed in the literature
on hybridization, any conclusion concerning possible
effects of managerialism on professionalism is not
deducted. To put it differently, empirical evidence con-
firms that organizations serve as sites for professional
development; that the nature and scope of professional
work is somehow dependent on organizational pro-
cesses; and that professionals take new organizational
roles aligned with managerial values. However, these
three scopes linking professionalism to organization-
based dynamics do not confirm linear alignment of pro-
fessionalism with managerialism. Surgeons’ professional
values and interests remain autonomous from those of
management given that no differences were introduced
in the CD related to work models, growing administra-
tive control or loss of autonomy in decision-making.
The hybrid manager is key to understand the limited
exposure of practising professionals to hybridization.
The hybrid manager did not strengthen financial tools of
control, and clinical tools remained discretionary-based
and independent from the hospital’s board of directors’
intervention. As suggested in other studies medical
authority can get reinforced in organizational settings
subject to NPM-driven reforms [27, 38, 42, 45, 49].
Furthermore, surgeons’ enhanced performance does
not in their clinicians’ minds translate into hybridization.
Growing productivity is correlated with expertise and
skills acquisition as well as with the growing capacity to
perform autonomously from the clinical director’s con-
trol. They realize that the more they perform the better
they do it; and that their purpose is to meet the clinical
director’s standards and expectations.
On the other hand, the underlying influence of the na-
ture of medical procedures in all these dynamics should
not be disregarded. As seen, not all medical specialties can
perform as quickly and as predictably as surgery. In this
sense, organized professionalism needs to be reassessed
along with the so-called balkanized effects. The shift lies
in considering the organizational scope of professionalism
not in relation to the organization but in relation to one of
its divisionalized parts. Balkanized-organized professional-
ism is not opposed to, and builds on the original definition
of, organized professionalism. The difference is that pro-
fessionalism is aligned with but not limited to the
organization as it is often assumed in the literature.
Balkanization is introduced in two complementary ways.
One is to consider balkanized professional interests, which
result from processes of gatekeeping as those enacted by
the hybrid manager. Consequently practising professionals
pursue interests according to specific motivations set by
the professional leader, regardless of the organization’s
overall administrative functioning. The other complemen-
tary way is to consider balkanized structures in the
organization. As mentioned before, the goals and pro-
cesses undertaken in autonomous units within the
organization may diverge from each other and from the
organization’s mission as a whole. The mission and voca-
tion of the CD do not necessarily converge with those of
the hospital. In sum, what makes organized professional-
ism balkanized is the fact that it is not common to either
professions or organizations.
Conclusion
Building on the experience of this CD, which differs from
that reported in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries
[26, 33], the discussion on hybridized managerial roles
highlights the need to consider more seriously the impact
of specific features of the governance models of health
systems. However, few attempts to clarify such empirical
variation have been made to include national-based pol-
icies in the creation of hybrid organizational configura-
tions. For this reason, the key requirement in this study
was to capture organizational change from the inside and
while the process was underway by combining qualitative
research tools that neither cross-country comparisons nor
quantitative data have been able to provide.
Unlike often suggested, the establishment of this CD
reveals the extent to which organizational structures
comprising hybrid roles can be driven and supported by
clinicians. Although CDs are expected to lead to greater
accountability over professionals in general and to dilute
medical authority in particular, data has shown that
policy orientation is subject to specific processes con-
trolled by clinicians at the workplace level. Regarding the
relationship between medicine and management, policy
setting and expected outcomes are not correlated as one
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might assume. Possible explanations include unchanged
governance mechanisms at the macro-level, thus exposing
organizational change to micro-level variations; lack of
involvement of regulatory professional boards in policy
setting; few changes in medical training in terms of man-
agement skills; or the charismatic authority clinicians still
enjoy among the population in general.
Contingency in the establishment of this CD also
highlighted the key role of the hybrid manager in determin-
ing the extent to which practising professionals are more
accountable to managerial criteria and consequently the en-
suing effects on their autonomy. The overall conclusion is
that although medical and managerial values link to each
other, clinicians are able to make use of and reconfigure
managerial criteria according to specific interests. Ultim-
ately, medical autonomy and authority may be reinforced
in organizational settings subject to NPM-driven reforms.
Yet, such ability is rather specific to medical specialties thus
contributing to a growing re-stratification in medicine. The
discussion suggests forms of balkanized (divisionalized)
medical professionalism reinforced by hybrid roles.
Several implications for practise can be drawn, thus
highlighting directions for future research. First, it has
been confirmed that hybrid managers enhance clinical
and management outcomes, and that they can perform a
key role in determining organizational change. Second,
clinicians’ commitment to work is not correlated with
growing managerial intervention in daily processes; their
performance is rather based on financial incentives. In
the absence of managerial rules, professional leaders play
a key role in clinical safety and quality, particularly in
the selection and management of human resources.
Third, unintended consequences of divisionalized struc-
tures may arise regarding the functioning of public hos-
pitals, given that professionals are less committed to the
overall mission and vocation of the hospital as a whole.
Such consequences may include lack of articulation in
care, growing differentiation among public servants, and
greater conflicts among wards for improved conditions.
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